A New Full-Time Norm: Promoting Work-Life Integration Through Work-Time Adjustment
Drawing on the work of scholars in numerous disciplines, particularly sociology and economics, this article provides a summary of data showing changes in working time in the United States over the past few decades and the difficulties these create, especially in what I will call the realm of care, and the inequities they entail. It is a compendium of the basic situation of working time facing American workers with some international comparisons. I discuss weaknesses of current accommodations--for example, part-time employment and the Family and Medical Leave Act-and explore options for challenging current full-time norms, such as shorter workyears, workweeks, or workdays.
Ultimately, sharing the view of other writers (Fraser 1996; Harrington 1999; Williams 2000; and especially Appelbaum et al. 2002) , I argue for a more balanced valuing of market work and care to facilitate a transition to a shorter full-time norm.
The "subtle revolution" (Smith 1979) in the twentieth century of increased women's labor force participation is contributing to a revolution at home in which the conventional household division of labor, whereby men are the sole breadwinners and women are full-time homemakers and caretakers, has been disrupted. Women continue their traditional roles as primary caregivers even when employed outside the home, however, thus creating a stressful "second shift" of unpaid work at home (Hochschild 1989) . Combining work and family responsibilities has been difficult for most women and increasing numbers of men who are taking on more family responsibilities. Business practices and government policies have begun to respond to these challenges, but for a variety of reasons they remain inadequate. In the absence of adequate public and private responses to the growing need to better integrate work and family, a crisis in parenting and caregiving is emerging (Harrington 1999) . This paper explores a new, shorter, fulltime norm as a possible solution to the problem of work-family integration specifically and work-life integration more generally. It also examines growing inequity in worktime distribution across the American population wherein certain groups are overworked and others underemployed.
My argument for a new, shorter, full-time norm in the United States begins with an examination of the context within which many Americans experience a sense of time famine. This context includes the increased labor force participation of women, particularly married women with children, over the last 50 years, and a caregiving gap that has emerged as a result of women's absence from the home.
Women's Labor Force Participation
The labor force participation rates of women in the United States, especially married women and mothers, have increased dramatically during the past 50 years. The expanding role of women in the paid labor force can be attributed to higher educational attainment by women in the post-World War Two era, expansion of certain economic sectors that rely disproportionately on women's labor, economic stresses created by a prolonged stagnation of wages, and women's own desire to participate in the paid labor force.
Trends in women's labor force participation in the United States have been steadily upward for virtually every female socioeconomic and demographic group. In 1940, 86 percent of married women were full-time homemakers, but, by 1994, 61 percent were in the paid labor force (Blau and Ehrenberg 1997: 1) . The percentage of women in the paid labor force has steadily increased since the 1950s. Today, women are less likely to step out of the labor force while bearing and raising children, a fairly common practice as recently as 30 years ago. Between 1940 and 1995, women workers increased from one quarter to nearly one half of the labor force. Before World War Two, labor force participation was highest among working class, poor, and minority women. Middle class and affluent women remained outside the paid labor force as beneficiaries of relatively high family wages paid to their employed husbands. Today, large numbers of middle class and affluent women hold paying jobs. Comparing the labor force participation rates of different birth cohorts of women, Hartmann (2001:130) notes that each new cohort of women has worked more than the one before; each has generally worked more as they aged; and each has worked more steadily during the child rearing years, spending less time out of the labor force when they have children. While labor force participation rates declined between ages 20-29 among women born before the 1950s, they do not among women born in later years.
Women's labor force participation rates continue to be lower than men's, but their rates appear to be gradually converging. By the year 2006, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that 61.4 percent of U.S. women will participate in the paid labor force compared to 73.6 percent of men. While the labor force participation rates of women are expected to increase, men's rates are expected to decline. Though fewer women than men participate in the labor force, across every age group the distribution of the labor force by gender has become nearly identical. By 1996, for example, 24.9 percent of the civilian labor force ages 25 to 34 were female compared to 25.6 percent that were male.
In 1960, only 17.8 percent of the labor force in this age group was female compared to 22.1 percent male (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 400).
Some of the most dramatic increases in labor force participation nationally have been among women with children. The labor force participation rate of women with children under age 6 increased from 38.8 percent in 1975 to 62.3 percent in 1996. For women with children ages 6 to 17 the rate increased from 54.8 percent to 77.2 percent (Hayghe 1997: 42) .
Issues in Family Care
Increases in their workforce participation rates and other demographic factors have resulted in significant changes for women and their families over the last several decades. Dual-earner couples, in which both parents work for wages, have grown from about one-third of families with children in 1975 to nearly half in 1999 (Hartmann 2001:145) . About 20 percent of families with children are still the "traditional" type, i.e., an employed father and stay-at-home mother without wage work obligations, down from nearly half of all families in 1975 and 67 percent in 1940 (Hartmann 2001:145; Reskin and Padavic 1994:144) . Moreover, increases in divorce and the number of unmarried mothers have increased the number of families maintained solely by employed women.
The proportion of women who are single heads of household in the workforce grew from about 5 percent in 1965 to a little over 11 percent in 1992 (Reskin and Padavic 1994:145) . Very few of the 19 percent of families with working mothers (in singleearner families) today include a husband at home. And only about 4.5 percent of all families with children are headed by a non-married, working father, so that men are much less likely than women to experience the difficulties of being the custodial single parent (Hartmann 2001:145) .
The dramatic changes in women's labor force participation and family structure have altered the dynamics of family life in the home. A recent profile of the U.S.
workforce (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997) shows that:
-85 percent of wage and salaried workers live with family members and have day-to-day family responsibilities; -46 percent of wage and salaried workers are parents; that is, they have children under age 18 who live with them at least half of the time; Time management can be difficult for anyone-female or male, married or notwho is juggling the responsibilities of employment and family care. Because women continue to be the primary caretakers of children and other dependents, a major problem for women is finding time for paid work, caregiving, and housework. Consequently, research suggests that women bear more of the stress associated with integrating the two arenas of work and family.
Housework. Research consistently shows that employed women do as much as twice the amount of housework as men. A study by Shelton (1992 as cited in Reskin and Padavic 1994:150) , for example, found that women who were employed full time spent an estimated 33 hours a week on housework compared with men's 20. Schor (1991) estimates that women average 65 hours a week in paid and unpaid work. Despite variations in estimates of housework hours across a number of studies reviewed by Robinson and Godbey (1997:100) , the ratio of women's estimates to men's is virtually constant. Not controlling for employment status, women estimate about twice as many hours as men devoted to household work. Robinson and Godbey's (1997) own 1985 time diaries bear this out. Work in the paid labor force has also reduced the amount of time available to do housework, possibly intensifying the pace of work at home as well as increasing the stresses associated with it.
According to one study, for each hour a woman puts into her paid job, her housework efforts are reduced by a half hour (Schor 1991 as cited in Reskin and Padavic 1994:149) . Wives' employment status-that is, whether they are employed full time, part time, or not at all-has little effect on how much housework men do, however. Men who are better educated or have a young child at home do slightly more than other men (Shelton 1992; Thompson and Walker 1991 ; both as cited in Reskin and Padavic 1994:151) , as do African-American and Hispanic men (Shelton and John 1993 as cited in Reskin and Padavic 1994:151) . Some evidence indicates that men are doing more housework than they did 20 years ago. Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg. (1997) report that over the past 20 years mothers' workday time on chores has decreased by 36 minutes per day while men's time has increased by one hour. Despite this narrowing of the gap, employed women still spend more time on chores than employed married men on both workdays and days off, whether or not they have children.
Dependent Care. In the absence of plentiful, high-quality, affordable child care, employed parents struggle to meet the demands of their jobs without neglecting their children. When a child is ill, mothers usually take time off from their jobs. In a recent study, 83 percent of employed mothers said they are more likely than their partners to take time off compared with 22 percent of fathers who make this claim (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997:7) .
Elder care poses another potential difficulty for employees given that 87 percent of workers surveyed by the Families and Work Institute said they currently have elder care responsibilities (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997:152) . In American society, female relatives provide most of the care of aging persons, and they do so informally. As more women are employed, they are less available to care for aging relatives.
The factors underlying women's disadvantaged economic position are complex, encompassing historical effects, occupational segregation, women's socialization, and women's education (Reskin and Padavic 1994 and others) . Some recent research efforts have focused in particular on the marginalization of mothers because of their caregiving responsibilities. This occurs because market work is a system set up according to an "Ideal Worker Norm" (Williams 2000) that assumes employees work full time (currently standardized at 40 hours per week), uninterruptedly, i.e., free of the necessity to bear children and without caregiving responsibilities that might interfere with full-time wage work. Because mothers' lives are at variance from the ideal worker norm, they are disproportionately relegated to marginal jobs-often at low wages-but with work routines that mesh relatively well with caregiving. The marginalization of mothers in market work results in a wage penalty, although the estimates of this penalty vary somewhat---6 percent for mothers with one child and 13 percent for mothers with two or more children according to Waldfogel's research (1997) and 7 percent per child according to Budig and England's recent study (2001) .
Workplace and Public Policy Initiatives
While recent data indicate that employers have become more responsive to employees' needs, the vast majority of American workers still struggle to integrate employment and family responsibilities. In the last couple of decades, a variety of alternative work arrangements have emerged at workplaces to alleviate work-family conflict experienced by employees, and in 1993 the federal government took a significant step by enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act. These initiatives are explored below. Generally, alternative work arrangements offer individual workers increased flexibility, but they are band-aid solutions to a much larger structural problem.
Relatively few workers use them, and women use them more often than men--thus ratifying gender inequity (Negrey 1993; Rapoport et al. 2002) . Flexible arrangements may deviate from the rigid 40-hour norm, but they do not challenge the norm per se; and the inability to work a standard schedule is assumed to be an individual problem, not a societal problem. The FMLA is more broad-based, but, because it provides for only unpaid leave and pertains only to episodic circumstances, it is inadequate as well.
Alternative Work Arrangements. Several forms of alternative work arrangements have emerged at workplaces throughout the United States. Conventional part-time employment is by far the most prevalent "option" through which employees gain flexibility because employers in growing sectors, such as services and retail trade, make it widely available to fulfill their own needs for flexible staffing. Flextime, compressed workweeks, job sharing, and home-based work are other increasingly popular alternatives.
The Families and Work Institute (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997:10) found that 45 percent of employees are able to choose-within limits-when they begin and end their workdays, but only one in four can change daily schedules as needed. Twothirds of employees find it relatively easy to take time off during the workday to address family or personal matters. However, only 50 percent of employed parents are able to take a few days off from work to care for sick children without losing pay, forfeiting vacation time, or having to fabricate some excuse for missing work. Another 19 percent of employees spend at least part of their regular workweek working at home, while 7 percent say they would be permitted to do so if they wished. Arlie Hochschild's (1997) popular book, The Time Bind, showed how factors in company culture militate against workers' use of family-friendly policies, despite their availability and eligibility.
A recent study by the U.S. Department of Labor found that flextime practices in America's workplaces are more informal than formal. The study reports that nearly 29 percent of full-time workers in the U.S. have schedules that allow them to vary the times they begin and end their work day, but only about one-third of those employees work for companies with official flextime policies. Flexible schedules were most common among executives, administrators, managers, and sales workers. Men and whites were also somewhat more likely to have flexible schedules (Strope 2003) .
Some business groups are advocating greater availability of compensatory time for overtime work instead of overtime pay, but labor leaders and other critics are skeptical that such proposals are just a ploy to permit companies to avoid paying overtime wages while lengthening working time. Critics also fear that workers would be pressured to take compensatory time rather than overtime pay or might not be able to actually take the compensatory time they have accumulated or that employers would restrict when compensatory time could be taken or cut back on sick leave and vacation time (Eisenbrey 2003; Golden 2003; Strope 2003) . New overtime rules imposed under the Bush administration could cause up to 117,000 workers earning more than $100,000 annually to lose overtime pay while 1.3 million low-wage workers currently denied overtime would become eligible, according to Bush administration estimates. The Economic Policy Institute, on the other hand, argues that 6 million workers would lose overtime eligibility (Crutsinger 2004) . One contributor to longer hours is the increasing number of workers who are excluded from the overtime protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Those exempt from these overtime provisions has risen from about 32 percent of the workforce in 1978 to 40 percent in the late 1990s (Hamermesh 2000) . In some industries, such as transportation, agriculture, communications, and mining, more than a quarter of all workers work more than 40 hours a week; and mandatory involuntary overtime is a problem for an estimated 18 percent of the American workforce (Golden 2003) . In a survey conducted by the Heldrich Center for Workforce Development (1999 as cited by Golden 2003) , 45 percent of workers reported having to work overtime on little or no notice.
The Family and Medical
Analysis of data from the 1992 National Study of the Changing Workforce shows that most American workers experience a significant gap between their actual and ideal work hours. While approximately one-third of respondents reported that their actual and ideal hours corresponded precisely, nearly half indicated that their usual workweek was longer than their ideal and an additional one-sixth reported that they would prefer to work more hours. Ninety percent of those who expressed a preference for shorter working hours wished to work at least five hours less per week. While women on average work about six fewer hours per week than men, the gap between women and men's actual and ideal hours is quite similar. It is this gap between actual and ideal hours that goes a long way toward explaining the sense of overwork that many Americans feel (Jacobs and Gerson 1998) . Researchers using data from the more recent National Survey of Families and Households also find a gap between actual work hours and preferences, i.e., that people are working more than they would like to work (Clarkberg 2000) . 
Work-Time Reduction in Europe.
While it is assumed that paid working time has become progressively shorter in the industrialized countries following technological advances, in reality there has been no clear linear trend (Figart and Golden 1998) .
Working time has varied considerably across countries and within countries by industry, occupation, gender, race, family type, and historical time period (Figart and Golden 1998) . In contrast to the twin trends of overwork and underemployment in the United States discussed above, annual and weekly hours in Western Europe have declined in recent decades as a result of statutory and collectively bargained restrictions on standard and overtime hours in the European Union. The trend toward shorter hours in Europe has slowed since the 1980s as employers and governments have pursued greater flexibility resulting in greater diversity of work patterns as in the United States (Figart and Golden 1998 ).
The recent efforts in France to reduce the standard workweek to 35 hours have produced a mixed bag of results at the intersection of the struggle of workers to reduce working time and employers to use their workforces more flexibly. To create jobs as a palliative for a historically high 12.5 percent unemployment rate, French trade unions, with two-thirds popular support, successfully advocated legislation to reduce the workweek to 35 hours from 39 with no loss of pay. The legislation, which took effect in January 2000, provided for public subsidies and tax breaks to encourage companies to comply with the 35-hour rule and hire more workers. In its early stages of implementation and with amendment, however, the law seems to have done little to genuinely reduce work time but has permitted employers to make work time more flexible, sometimes longer, and unpredictable. Critics claim the result is an increase in the size and scope of France's contingent workforce (Apter 1997; Ford 1998; Vinocur 1999; Arens and Thull 1999; Thull and Arens 2000) . Declines in productivity growth in the 1990s have created pressure to increase work hours not only in France but Germany as well where weekly hours in some sectors had also been reduced. In some instances the workweek has been extended beyond the 40-hour limit, such as in the German state of Bavaria where the workweek currently stands at 42 hours. In Britain more than one-fifth of the labor force works longer than the European Union's mandated maximum of 48 hours a week (Landler 2004) .
Work-Time and Gender.
Working time is gendered time. This is true when the unequal distribution of paid employment and unpaid household work is compared across men and women, and it is true when men and women are compared with respect to unequal patterns of alternative work arrangements and reduced work. So far, efforts to reorganize and/or reduce working time in the United States and Europe have not degendered working time. Instead, alternative work-time arrangements have ratified the conventional gender division of labor to the extent that women are more likely than men to avail themselves of reduced and flexible work-time options to better integrate employment and family responsibilities (Negrey 1993; Mutari 1998, 2000; Sirianni and Negrey 2000; Appelbaum et al. 2002) . Increasingly, gender roles are differentiated not by whether individuals have a job but the amount of time spent in paid employment. The expansion of overtime for men and part-time jobs for women reinforces the skewed division of domestic labor and occupational segregation Mutari 1998, 2000) . This skewed distribution of paid work time, domestic labor, and occupational segregation is at once a product of and reinforced by gender inequity in pay.
The rational dual-earner household has less to lose financially-but much to lose in terms of gender equity---when it is the wife who reduces her paid work hours. Escape, a travel magazine, recently formed a committee called Work to Live, whose goal is to increase vacation time in the U.S. to three weeks by law after the first year on the job and four weeks after three years (Robinson 2000) . The U.S. has surpassed Japan as the industrialized world's most overworked land; in total hours, Americans work two weeks longer than the Japanese each year, and two months longer than the Germans. According to a recent International Labor Organization (2002) While longer vacation time is appealing on its face, and certainly matches the interests of the travel industry, it does not address the sense of time famine that derives from the pressures of daily life and the lack of concordance between actual and ideal work schedules. Such pressures require relief more immediately and regularly than vacations would allow-thus, calls for reductions in the workweek.
A recent argument for a shorter paid workweek (LaJeunesse 1998) 2 , specifically four eight-hour days, claims that a shorter workweek would lead to higher productivity through more efficient use of work time on the part of workers (less fatigue and shirking) and less monitoring of shirking. A four-day workweek would require fewer days of child care per week and, if the length of the school day were increased to coincide with work hours, less need for before-and after-school day care. A four-day week could also reduce commuting. 3 Bailyn (1993: 84) also notes productivity improvements with reduced work time; she cites research documenting that part-time work and job sharing increase productivity per hour worked. Further evidence comes from a case study of a small injection-molding plastics plant in southern Indiana that increased labor recruitment and retention, reduced absenteeism, improved product quality through a reduced scrap rate, and increased productivity overall by reducing shifts from eight to six hours (five days/week). The plant did this without reducing pay by tacking on a ten-hour bonus at the end of thirty hours worked per week (Negrey 1998) . LaJeunesse (1998: 100) cites historical evidence that major reductions of hours in Britain preceded, rather than followed, peaks of productivity growth. In France in 1983, when legislation to reduce the statutory workweek to 39 hours from 40 took effect, hourly productivity rose 6 percent compared to a 2-percent increase the year before (and less than 4 percent since) (LaJeunesse 1998: 101) .
Another way to reduce the workweek is to reduce the standard length of the workday. Beechey and Perkins (1987: 107) have argued that appeals for work-time reduction that focus on the length of the workweek rather than the length of the workday are often masculine in their orienting assumptions. A feminist approach to work-time would emphasize reduction in the length of the workday (such as five six-hour days, especially to mesh with children's school days), work-time flexibility, and limits on overtime, evening, night, and weekend work. Kellogg's experiment with the six-hour day is an interesting case in this regard. Instituted in the 1930s in response to economic difficulties caused by the Depression, the experiment was terminated in the 1980s when the company claimed it could no longer afford such an arrangement in the face of heightened competitive pressures. The experiment had eroded by the 1980s, however, as increasing numbers of male workers agitated for more hours-and more pay. The departments that retained the six-hour day employed women disproportionately (Hunnicutt 1996) .
Conclusion
The previous discussion of the shorter workweek vs. workday points to the trenchant problem facing parents today: conflict between paid work routines and children's routines or what Williams (2000) has called the ideal worker norm and the family care norm. One option is to maintain the status quo in working hours and expand children's school days and years. While this option might relieve conflict between parent work routines and child care by extending the time children are in the custody of the schools, it does not necessarily reduce the sense of time famine that many adults experience because they feel they spend too much time on the job relative to time with family, in leisure, in education and/or training, in community with others, and the like.
Nor does it address the difficulties of meshing employment and child care for preschoolers. The solution we choose---longer school days and years to better mesh with parents' long work hours or a new, shorter, full-time work norm to better mesh with children's school hours---is ultimately a statement on our values as a society for life, including its vast array of activities and possibilities, is a moral economy of time (Sirianni 1988) . Long work hours and long school routines mean we value market activity over most everything else in life. A new, shorter, full-time work norm means we value more balance between market and non-market activity. Hewlett and West (1998: 32) have noted an important irony, that conservatives---the staunchest defenders of markets---who lament the decline of "family values" often fail to recognize the ways in which market values destroy family values. But liberals, who are generally less critical of recent changes in family demographics and less sanguine in their support of markets, often don't see the contradictions between the market and families either. As we pursue an economic agenda of unfettered market growth, we stretch family relationships---temporally, emotionally, and geographically---to a breaking point. And as the bonds of family break, we turn to market institutions and relationships, as inadequate as they may be, to fill the void. In the process we undermine ties of community, and we literally trash our environment with the surplus stuff we feel compelled to make and sell. In our exasperation, we throw up our hands. In the absence of easy solutions, we blame individuals for failings that are often benign responses to the market forces and gender imperatives that govern their behavior.
If it is time to check our market impulses, we must do so in ways that do not erode the advances made in recent decades toward gender equity and that improve the market standing of the underemployed and working poor. Because the underemployed---as measured by work hours according to the current full-time norm---and the working poor are disproportionately women, both objectives can be pursued by improving the wages, benefits, and working conditions of workers in marginal jobs.
In redistributing our values from market to non-market activities, it is necessary to redistribute working time-good paid work from men to women, unpaid work from women to men, and overwork to the underemployed. The Universal Caregiver model espoused by Fraser (1996) encourages us to think in terms of everyone doing primary care work in addition to paid work, not just women predominantly. Our market work might be organized very differently if we begin from an assumption that all workers also (will) have caregiving responsibilities instead of assuming that particular, mostly Appelbaum et al. (2002) have proposed a "shared work/valued care" model of organizing market work and unpaid care work that attends to goals of gender equity and more balance between market work and non-market care work. Shared work has multiple meanings: sharing paid work among people through shorter workweeks, reduced hours, flexible schedules, and job sharing; sharing access to good jobs in both the public and private sectors with mothers, including skilled blue collar, professional, and managerial jobs; equal access to paid jobs for women through the recognition that care
work, even when it is unpaid, is work; men as well as women must share in the important work of providing care within the family and the broader community; and sharing the work of caring with community and other public institutions. Valued care has many meanings as well: access to a variety of flexible scheduling strategies so employees can have greater control of their time at work and away from work and can negotiate the flexibility they need to meet their individual responsibilities; day care and elder care
should be shared public-private responsibilities so that families can have access to high quality services while day care workers, nursing assistants, and others who care for the young, the old, the sick, and the infirm can have access to well-paying jobs.
A public policy strategy to promote the "shared work/valued care" model has six cornerstones (Appelbaum et al. 2002) :
• Hours of work legislation to allow for a shorter standard workweek for all, flexibility for workers, longer part-time hours, and limits on mandatory overtime;
• Adjustment of hours legislation to allow workers to request up to a 20 percent reduction in hours and pro-rated reductions in pay and benefits that employers would have to honor unless there was a good business reason not to do so;
• Equal opportunity and non-discrimination provisions to protect workers on parttime schedules from discrimination in pay or benefits, to encourage private sector employers to make good part-time jobs widely available, and to reduce the gender gap in pay;
• Share the cost of care by investing in day care and elder care infrastructure and by providing subsidies for child care and elder care, short-term caregivers' leave, subsidized wages or tax credits for caregivers, universal pre-school, and after-and before-school programs for children;
• Untie benefits from individual employers by making access to health insurance available to everyone without regard to employment status and by establishing funds similar to unemployment insurance for maternity leave, parental leave, and long-term family medical leave; provide a floor under wages by indexing the minimum wage to the median wage;
• Update income security protections such as unemployment insurance and old age pensions so they are no longer geared toward an outdated model of work and care that assumes a full-time breadwinner and full-time homemaker.
These six cornerstones illustrate a way in which a new, shorter, full-time norm could be the centerpiece of a larger social reorganization that could facilitate greater work-life
